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MacDonnell: The Doctrine of Recapture

MONTANA V. WYOMING:
SPRINKLERS, IRRIGATION
WATER USE EFFICIENCY AND
THE DOCTRINE OF RECAPTURE
LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL *

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2007, Montana filed an original action with the United States
Supreme Court asserting that certain water uses in Wyoming violated the
Yellowstone River Compact (“Compact”). 1 The litigation was triggered
by severe drought in the basin between 2000 and 2006, during which
period there was inadequate water available for Montana appropriators in
the Tongue River and Powder River sub-basins. 2 Montana raised four
primary issues: irrigation of new acreage in Wyoming; new and
expanded storage facilities; new groundwater pumping, especially
associated with coalbed methane development; and increased
consumption of water due to improved irrigation efficiency on existing
irrigated acreage. 3 In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the first
substantive issue in this litigation: “Is a switch to more efficient
irrigation with less return flow within the extent of Wyoming’s pre-1950
users’ existing appropriative rights, or is it an improper enlargement of

*

Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law.
1
The Court granted Montana leave to file its complaint in Montana v. Wyoming, 552 U.S.
1175 (2008). Congress consented to the Yellowstone River Compact in the Act of Oct. 30, 1951,
Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663, 663.
2
See, e.g.,YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT COMM’N, FIFTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT Att. B
(2006) [hereinafter “55th Annual Report”] (letter from Jack Stults, Commissioner for Montana,
describing water shortages in the Tongue River sub-basin of Montana).
3
Montana Bill of Complaint at 3, ¶¶ 8-11, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011)
(No. 137, Orig.).
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that right to the detriment of Montana’s pre-1950 water users?” 4 The
Court held that such improvements are permitted under the Compact. 5
This Article takes a careful look at this decision. It begins with an
introduction to the physical setting, focusing on the Tongue and Powder
sub-basins within the Yellowstone basin. It discusses Montana’s
arguments why the Compact precludes improved irrigation efficiency
that increases consumption and the Special Master’s rejection of those
arguments. Next, the Article looks at the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion.
Finally, it offers some observations triggered by this litigation, critiques
the doctrine of recapture in western water law, and supports the Court’s
embrace of water use efficiency over protection of the status quo. We
begin with a look at the Yellowstone River basin.
II.

THE BASIN, THE COMPACT, AND THE CONTROVERSY

A.

THE BASIN

The Yellowstone River basin includes an area of about 70,100
square miles nearly equally divided between Montana (51%) and
Wyoming (48%), with a very small portion in North Dakota (1%). 6
While coal mining and oil and gas development are important in some
portions of the basin, grazing is the dominant land use. 7 About five
percent of the land area is used for irrigated agriculture, primarily for
production of hay and grass. 8 Agricultural uses account for 99% of
surface water uses in the basin. 9
Montana challenges Wyoming water uses in the Tongue and
Powder River basins only. These rivers are both tributaries of the
Yellowstone that originate on the eastern side of the Big Horn Mountains
of Wyoming and flow north across the border into Montana. They are
both small rivers, even by western standards. The Tongue begins in the
northern Big Horns and collects water from a series of small tributaries
in the general vicinity of Sheridan, Wyoming, before crossing the border
with Montana. Most of the Tongue drainage, which accounts for only
eight percent of the total area of the Yellowstone basin, is located in
4

Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765, 1773 (2011).
Id. at 1779.
6
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NATIONAL WATER-QUALITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM,
YELLOWSTONE RIVER BASIN, USGS FACT SHEET 149-97, at 2 [hereinafter “YELLOWSTONE BASIN
WATER QUALITY”], available at pubs.usgs.gov/fs/FS-149-97/fs-149-97.pdf.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
5
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Montana. 10 Wyoming estimates the total available flow of the Tongue in
normal years is 326,000 acre-feet. 11 The Powder begins to the south, in
the general vicinity of Kaycee, Wyoming, and includes 19% of the
Yellowstone basin, again mostly in Montana. 12 Wyoming estimates the
total available flow of the Powder is 324,000 acre-feet in normal years. 13
Flows vary dramatically within the year and from year to year. A federal
report on the Yellowstone River Basin, prepared in 1940, noted, “the
Tongue and Powder are practically dry in late summer.” 14
B.

THE COMPACT

Montana and Wyoming began efforts to reach agreement on a
compact apportioning waters of the Yellowstone Basin in 1932, finally
succeeding in 1950. 15 The reliable direct flow of the Tongue and Powder
Rivers had long been fully appropriated during the late irrigation season,
so storage was necessary to capture the peak spring flows for use in later
summer. As the Special Master noted, 16 the “compelling reason” for the
compact was to obtain federal funding for construction of such
projects. 17
Most important for purposes of this Article is Article V of the
Compact, which provides for the allocation of water among the three
states. 18 First, Article V provides that all appropriative rights existing as
of January 1, 1950, “shall continue to be enjoyed.” 19 The effect of this

10

Id. at 2-3.
WYOMING STATE WATER PLAN, POWDER/TONGUE RIVER BASIN WATER PLAN: FINAL
REPORT Table III-14 (2002) [hereinafter “POWDER/TONGUE PLAN”]. An acre-foot of water is the
amount contained within a foot of water covering an acre of land. It equals 325,851 gallons.
12
YELLOWSTONE BASIN WATER QUALITY, supra note 6, at 2-3.
13
POWDER/TONGUE PLAN, supra note 11, tbl.III-14.
14
FED. POWER COMM’N, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON YELLOWSTONE RIVER BASIN 27 (Dec.
1940).
15
A good summary of the negotiation process is provided in the First Interim Report of the
Special Master at 6-9, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.).
16
A Special Master is the person appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court to act as the finder of
fact in original jurisdiction matters. For a critique of the role of Special Masters, see Anne-Marie C.
Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court’s
Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625 (2002). In this case the Special Master is Barton
H. Thompson, professor at Stanford Law School. He was officially appointed in Montana v.
Wyoming, 129 S. Ct. 480 (2008).
17
First Interim Report of the Special Master at 6, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765
(2011) (No. 137, Orig.). Despite the Compact, federal funding to support construction of storage on
the Powder and Tongue Rivers never materialized.
18
Yellowstone Compact art. V, Act of Oct. 30, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663, 666.
19
Id. art. V(A) (“Appropriative rights to the beneficial uses of the water of the Yellowstone
River System existing in each signatory State as of January 1, 1950, shall continue to be enjoyed in
11
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provision is to maintain these uses without attempting to create any kind
of interstate priority system. 20 The primary concern of compact
negotiators was to apportion the unappropriated water, the peak flows
that could be stored for later use. First priority to the peak flows is given
to those with pre-1950 rights who need supplemental water. 21 Next in
line are those constructing storage or developing direct flow diversions
for new uses. 22 These uses are apportioned between Montana and
Wyoming on a percentage basis of what is called the annual divertible
flow. 23 Thus, for example, Montana will enjoy the use of 60% of this
amount in the Tongue basin while Wyoming is apportioned 40%. 24
C.

THE CONTROVERSY

A series of below-average runoff years between 2000 and 2006 in
the Tongue and Powder basins resulted in critical water shortages in both
Montana and Wyoming. As reported in the minutes of the Yellowstone
Compact Commission in 2006, Montana requested that Wyoming
regulate its post-1950 water rights so that Montana’s pre-1950 water
rights holders could receive water. 25 Wyoming responded that it had
already curtailed diversions by appropriators with priority dates
extending back into the 1800s. 26 In 2007, Montana filed its complaint

accordance with the laws governing the acquisition and use of water under the doctrine of
appropriation.”).
20
First Interim Report of the Special Master at 30, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765
(2011) (No. 137, Orig.).
21
Yellowstone Compact, art. V(B), Act of Oct. 30, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663,
666 (“[T]here is allocated to each signatory State such quantity of that water as shall be necessary to
provide supplemental water supplies for the rights described in paragraph A of this Article V, . . . .”).
22
Id. (“[T]he remainder of the unused and unappropriated water is allocated to each State for
storage or direct diversions for beneficial use on new lands or for other purposes . . . .”).
23
See First Interim Report of the Special Master at 64, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct.
1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.).
24
Yellowstone Compact, art. V(B)(3), Act of Oct. 30, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat.
663, 667. Montana also is given the right to use 58% of this amount in the Powder, Wyoming 42%.
25
“Ms. Sexton reported that Montana made a call for water to the Wyoming State Engineer
under the Yellowstone River Compact on July 28, 2006, regarding the Tongue and Powder Rivers
(Attachments B, C, and D—call letter and responses). The situation on the Tongue River was dire
and Montana was unable to fill the Tongue River Reservoir this year. Montana’s biggest concern
was their inability to fulfill all pre-1950 water rights. Montana also was concerned about flow in the
Powder River. The Powder River at Moorhead, Montana (Montana-Wyoming border) essentially
went dry on July 25, 2006, and the average flow for that date is 215 ft3/s. This was the second time
that Montana made a call for water on Wyoming. A previous call was made in 2004.” 55th Annual
Report, supra note 2, at X. “The seven straight years of below normal flows from water years 2000
through 2006 is the longest such series in the monitoring records of [the Tongue River State Line
gauge].” MONT. BD. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 2009 TONGUE RIVER HYDROLOGY REPORT 5 (Sept.
2009).
26
55th Annual Report, supra note 2, at X (“Mr. Tyrrell reported on water-year
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with the U.S. Supreme Court.
III. MONTANA’S ALLEGATIONS, THE INTERIM REPORT, AND
MONTANA’S EXCEPTIONS
A.

MONTANA’S ALLEGATIONS

Montana framed its complaint in terms of Wyoming’s refusal to
“curtail consumption of the waters of the Tongue and Powder Rivers in
excess of Wyoming’s consumption of such waters existing as of January
1, 1950, whenever the amount of water necessary to satisfy Montana’s
uses of such waters existing as of that date is not passing the WyomingMontana state line, in violation of Montana’s rights under Article V of
the Compact.” 27 Relevant to this Article is the assertion that “[s]ince
January 1, 1950, Wyoming has allowed the consumption of water on
existing irrigated acreage in the Tongue and Powder River Basins to be
increased in violation of Montana’s rights under Article V of the
Compact.” 28 In its brief in support of its complaint, Montana alleged that
appropriators in the Tongue and Powder basins in Wyoming had
installed sprinkler systems in place of traditional flood irrigation
methods. 29 Sprinklers, it asserted, are “a much more consumptive
method of irrigation.” 30 Montana alleged that sprinklers increase
consumption from 65% of water diverted to 90%, thereby reducing
return flows from 35% of the diverted water to only 10%. 31 Montana
argued Wyoming should have imposed administrative requirements to
offset adverse effects on Montana appropriators. 32

administration highlights in Wyoming. In the Tongue River basin, water rights junior to 1883 were
regulated on Little Goose Creek. Big Goose Creek was regulated to 1885 after June 27 and Sheridan
was on water restrictions by mid-July. Reservoir water was released into Big Goose and Little Goose
Creeks starting in mid-June and continued throughout the summer. Wolf Creek was regulated to
1883 after July 10. Little Tongue River was regulated to 1883 and Smith Creek was regulated to
1881 through the summer. By late August, only instream stock use was allowed on these rivers and
creeks. In early September, flows in the Tongue River were regulated to 1891 on the reach above the
Tongue River ditch at Ranchester.”).
27
Montana Bill of Complaint at 3, ¶ 8, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No.
137, Orig.).
28
Id. at 4, ¶ 12.
29
Montana’s Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 15, Montana
v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 16.
32
Id.
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THE INTERIM REPORT

The Special Master (“Master”) issued his First Interim Report on
February 10, 2010. The Report dealt at length with Montana’s argument
respecting increased consumption of water by Wyoming pre-1950 water
rights holders. 33 The Master began by describing the manner in which
water is diverted and used for irrigation, noting that only a portion of the
water is consumed in the use with the remainder returning to the
hydrologic system and becoming available for diversion and use by other
appropriators. 34 The Master noted that this issue differed from the others
raised by Montana because it involved only the pre-1950 appropriators in
each state. 35 He explained the grandfathering of pre-1950 rights as a
determination by the compact negotiators that it would be expensive and
difficult to administer such rights, and that their administration would be
of limited benefit. 36 While acknowledging Montana was not asking for
traditional administration, the Master nevertheless commented on the
practical problems for Wyoming associated with addressing Montana’s
complaint. 37
The Master’s legal analysis began with a consideration of the
language of Article V(A) of the Compact. Montana argued the increase
in consumption was an increase in beneficial use not permitted under the
Compact. 38 The Master found, however, that Article V(A) concerns only
the amount of water diverted, not consumed. 39 He noted that prior
appropriation water rights are described in terms of an amount of water
that may be diverted, subject to the requirement that this amount be
beneficially used. 40 If the drafters had intended to limit pre-1950 rights to
the amount of water consumed, the Master pointed out, they would have
used such language. 41 Montana noted the definition of beneficial use in
the Compact refers to “that use by which the water supply of a drainage
basin is depleted when usefully employed by the activities of man.” 42
33

This discussion begins at 54 and continues to 90. First Interim Report of the Special
Master at 54-90, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.).
34
Id. at 54-55.
35
Id. at 56.
36
Id. at 57.
37
Id. at 58. For starters, Wyoming would have to determine its pre-1950 appropriators’
efficiency levels and identify changes in return flows for each appropriator who installed sprinklers.
38
Id. at 59.
39
First Interim Report of the Special Master at 60, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765
(2011) (No. 137, Orig.).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Yellowstone Compact, art. II(H), Act of Oct. 30, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663,
665.
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The Master decided this reference to depletion was simply intended to
reflect the traditional notion of prior appropriation that a diversion of
water is for some consumptive-use-based purpose. 43
Noting that the language of Article V(A) refers to continued
enjoyment under the doctrine of appropriation, the Master then
undertook an extensive review of this law to see if it contains any
limitations on increasing consumption through improved efficiency. His
review revealed no case that directly addressed the issue presented by
Montana in this litigation, which the Master restated as follows:
[C]an (1) an agricultural appropriator, (2) increase his or her
consumption of water, (3) on the same irrigated acreage to which the
appropriative right attaches, (4) to the detriment of downstream
appropriators, (5) in the same water system from which the water was
originally withdrawn? 44

First, the Master reviewed the legal principles governing changes of
appropriative water rights. All prior-appropriation states limit such
changes of point of diversion, purpose of use, and place of use if the
change will injure other appropriators, such as by decreasing return flows
upon which they rely. 45 States utilize a formal review process to evaluate
the potential for such injury. Here, however, no such change of the water
right is involved—only a change in the method of irrigation. Just as with
changing the type of crop planted, changes in the manner of irrigation are
not required to be reviewed. 46 Without such state supervision, there is no
means for evaluating injury—suggesting that states do not intend to
restrict changes in return flows that may result in these instances.
Next, the Master reviewed the law governing the capture and reuse
of unconsumed water still in the possession of an appropriator after
initial use. 47 In general, states allow additional use of such water on the
same property and refuse to require appropriators to continue to make
this water available to adjacent, downgradient landowners until it has
reached a stream. 48 The Master viewed these cases as bolstering the
ability of an appropriator to increase consumption through more efficient

43

First Interim Report of the Special Master at 61, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765
(2011) (No. 137, Orig.).
44
Id. at 65.
45
Id. at 67.
46
Id. at 69.
47
Id. at 71.
48
Id. at 72-77.
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application of water. 49 In addition, the Master’s analysis of Wyoming
case law indicated strong support for the view that an appropriator can
increase consumption by recapturing and using unconsumed water on the
property. 50 The Master summarized his findings as follows:
Given the law of prior appropriation both at the time the Compact was
negotiated and today, I conclude that the Compact does not prohibit
Wyoming from allowing pre-1950 appropriators in the State to
increase their consumption of water on the lands they were irrigating
as of January 1, 1950 by improving their irrigation systems, even
when that reduces the runoff that reaches Montana. 51

He bolstered this conclusion by noting that it furthers the important
policy objective of improving water conservation. 52 He reiterated his
concern about the practical difficulty of determining efficiency effects. 53
C.

MONTANA’S EXCEPTIONS

Perhaps recognizing its weaknesses under prior-appropriation law,
Montana framed its exception to this portion of the Master’s Report as a
Compact-interpretation issue. Montana began by asserting that the
Compact imposed a duty on Wyoming to deliver a certain amount of
water each year to the Montana state line. 54 Wyoming had violated this
duty by allowing an increase in the consumption of pre-1950 water
rights, effectively increasing its share of basin water and the associated
benefits. 55 Montana reiterated its view that, because the definition of
beneficial use refers to depletion of the basin’s water supply, the plain
language of Article V(A) limits any increase in consumption by pre-1950
Wyoming appropriations. 56 Montana’s pre-1950 appropriators cannot
“continue to enjoy” their uses if increased consumption by pre-1950
Wyoming appropriators reduces the water supply upon which these uses
depend. 57 Noting the Master’s acceptance of Compact limitations on
depletions of water by post-1950 uses, Montana argued the same
49

First Interim Report of the Special Master at 73, 77, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct.
1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.).
50
Id. at 81.
51
Id. at 86.
52
Id. at 87.
53
Id.
54
Montana’s Exception and Brief at 14, 24, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011)
(No. 137, Orig.).
55
Id. at 16.
56
Id. at 18-19, 25.
57
Id. at 25-26.
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limitations should be applied to increased depletions by Wyoming’s pre1950 appropriations. 58 Urging that the language of the Compact is
unambiguous, Montana suggested there was no need to look at priorappropriation law generally. 59 Even if the language is ambiguous,
Montana argued, other authority supports Montana’s position. 60 Finally,
Montana asserted the Master’s analysis of general prior-appropriation
law was inconclusive, incorrect, and should be overruled. 61
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Special Master on a 7-1 vote,
with Justice Scalia dissenting. 62 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority,
focused primarily on whether “background principles” of priorappropriation law preclude more efficient uses of water because of
reduced return flows. 63 The Court framed the question in almost
precisely the terms employed by the Special Master: “whether Article
V(A) allows Wyoming’s pre-1950 water users—diverting the same
quantity of water for the same irrigation purpose and acreage as before
1950—to increase their consumption of water by improving their
irrigation systems even if it reduces the flow of water to Montana’s pre1950 users.” 64 The Court acknowledged some discomfort with having to
interpret state water law but felt compelled to do so because of the
Compact’s reference to enjoyment of pre-1950 appropriative rights under
the doctrine of appropriation. 65
The Court characterized Montana’s pre-1950 water users as junior
58

Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 28.
60
Montana’s Exception and Brief at 28-31, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011)
(No. 137, Orig.).(citing some materials from the negotiations and the Senate Report accompanying
approval of the Compact).
61
Id. at 32. Its primary basis was that the Compact preempted any contrary state law.
Moreover, Montana found support in those cases that protect downstream appropriators once the
unconsumed water has returned to the stream, the situation in this litigation prior to the installation
of sprinklers.
62
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765. Justice Kagan did not participate. The dissent
focused on giving meaning to the word “depleted” in the Compact’s definition of beneficial use,
interpreting it to mean that beneficial use is limited to the amount of water depleted by the use. Id. at
1780-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63
Id. at 1771 (majority opinion). Tellingly, the Majority inverted the order of Montana’s
arguments by leading with considerations of prior-appropriation law and then considering the
Compact language.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1773 n.5. The Court stated: “Our decision is not intended to restrict the States’
determination of their respective appropriation doctrines.” Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis of this
area of law is certain to be highly persuasive in any future litigation.
59
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appropriators under the prior-appropriation system. 66 It noted the
Compact placed all pre-1950 water users in the same position—that is,
the priority system does not apply interstate to regulate their uses. The
effect is that a senior Montana appropriator cannot require curtailment of
a junior Wyoming appropriator with a pre-1950 priority date. Thus, the
Court asked what protections are enjoyed by junior appropriators under
background principles of prior-appropriation law. It found an answer in
the principle that juniors can require that seniors use water strictly within
the confines of their rights. 67 The Court then asked whether a change of
irrigation method with consequent reduction of return flows is
permissible under an appropriative right. 68
The Court looked first at the no-injury rule that prevents making
changes of water rights that would harm other appropriators. Noting that
this rule is articulated as precluding changes that alter stream flows to the
material injury of downstream users, it explored whether that rule applies
to the type of change at issue in this litigation. 69 Finding the rule applies
only to changes of point of diversion, purpose of use, and place of use,
the Court concluded that “[i]mprovements to irrigation systems . . . fall
outside the no-injury rule as it exists in Montana and Wyoming.” 70 It
noted that neither the Montana nor the Wyoming statutes applying to
changes of use consider changing irrigation methods. 71 It also noted the
absence of litigation concerning the potential adverse effects of changed
methods of irrigation. 72 Thus, the Court concluded that such changes are
within the scope of an appropriative water right—that is, an appropriator
is free to make such changes irrespective of their effects on other water
users. 73
Next, the Court turned to what it called the “doctrine of
recapture,” 74 restating this doctrine as allowing an appropriator who has
diverted water for irrigation purposes to “recapture and reuse his own
runoff and seepage water before it escapes his control or his property.”75
66

Id. at 1772 (“For our purposes, Montana’s pre-1950 water users are similar to junior
appropriators.”).
67
Id.
68
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at 1773.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1774.
71
Id.
72
Id. (“The abundance of litigation over such changes—and the absence of any litigation
over the sort of change at issue here—strongly implies that irrigation efficiency improvements do
not violate the no-injury rule and were considered within the scope of the original appropriative
right.”).
73
Id.
74
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at 1774.
75
Id.
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The Court, like the Master, found this doctrine supportive of the
conclusion that changes in irrigation methods for purposes of efficiency
are within the scope of an appropriative right. 76 The Court acknowledged
the cases limiting that right if the unused water would return to the
source from which it was taken, which was the situation in this case. 77
But it found the law in Montana and Wyoming was to the contrary,
concluding that in these states “the original appropriator may freely
recapture his used water while it remains on his property and reuse it for
the same purpose on the same land.” 78
Finally, the Court considered Montana’s primary argument—that
the increase in consumption resulting from the changed irrigation method
is precluded by the terms of the Compact itself. Given the Court’s
analytical focus on the scope of an appropriative right, it restated
Montana’s argument as asserting that the Compact language altered the
traditional scope of Wyoming’s pre-1950 water rights. 79 The Court
rejected Montana’s reading of the Compact language, finding instead that
the reference to depletion in the definition of beneficial use was intended
simply to make clear that the protected pre-1950 uses were those
involving a depletion of water such as irrigation. 80 The Court found
Montana’s assertion that the intent was to limit pre-1950 water uses to
their consumption in 1950 was a drastic redefinition of beneficial use
without basis in the language of the Compact itself. 81 Moreover, the
Court rejected Montana’s argument that Article V(A) was intended to
guarantee Montana a specific quantity of water, noting the absence of the
kind of language used in other compacts for this purpose. 82
V.

RETHINKING THE DOCTRINE OF RECAPTURE

In both the Special Master’s and Supreme Court’s decisions, the
doctrine of recapture was discussed to support their conclusion that an
increase in consumption associated with a changed method of irrigation

76

Id. at 1776.
Id. at 1775.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 1777 (“Montana … argues that even if background principles of appropriation law
do not support its position, Article V(A) of the Compact does not protect the full scope of ordinary
appropriative rights.”).
80
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at 1778.
81
Id. (“Montana’s reading of the Compact . . . would drastically redefine the term ‘beneficial
use’ from its longstanding meaning. . . . If the Compact’s definition of ‘beneficial use’ were meant to
drastically redefine the term into shorthand for net water consumption, we would expect far more
clarity.”).
82
Id. at 1779.
77
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in Wyoming was permissible and did not legally impair enjoyment of use
by pre-1950 appropriators in Montana. 83 An independent look at the
doctrine of recapture, however, suggests it is inconsistent with the
fundamental law of prior appropriation and fails to adequately reflect
hydrologic realities that bind together users of water. An approach more
consistent with principles of prior appropriation would base the right of
recapture on the original intention of the appropriator. 84 Only in
situations in which the appropriator intended to recapture water
unconsumed after initial use for the original purpose for which the water
was appropriated and in which such recaptured water could be
beneficially used for the appropriation’s purpose, would a right of
recapture be recognized. Otherwise, diverted but unconsumed water
would return to the hydrologic system to become available for use by
others.
The Special Master noted the many cases that uphold the right of an
appropriator to recapture water unconsumed in the original use and to
reuse this water. 85 His review of these cases suggested one line
supporting a right of recapture because courts had denied the right of
subsequent users to demand continuation of those return waters. 86 From
these cases he concluded: “As a result, the original appropriator is always

83

First Interim Report of the Special Master at 86, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765
(2011) (No. 137, Orig.); see Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at 1777.
84
Intent is one of the traditional requirements of an appropriation. For an early statement of
this principle, see McDonald & Blackburn v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co., 13 Cal.
220, 232-33 (1859) (“The right accrues from appropriation; this appropriation is the intent to take,
accompanied by some open, physical demonstration of the intent, and for some valuable use”.).
While the requirement to openly demonstrate intent has been replaced by filing an application in
permit states, the concept of intent still has meaning in understanding the scope of an appropriation.
Intent can help to define an appropriator’s contemplated use. Thus, in Toohey v. Campbell, 24 Mont.
13, 60 P. 396, 397 (1900), the court stated: “But, as every appropriation must be made for a
beneficial or useful purpose . . . it becomes the duty of the courts to try the question of the claimant’s
intent by his acts and the circumstances surrounding his possession of the water, its actual or
contemplated use and the purposes thereof.” See also Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 752
F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 1985) (“An initial diversion of at least some water is an important indication
of intent. When water is diverted for irrigation purposes, and the amount continuously and gradually
increased, an intent to appropriate the quantity eventually used may logically be inferred. This could
include enough water to irrigate all irrigable acres.”) (citations omitted). In the context of a proposal
to capture and use seepage from water to be delivered from a reservoir, the Colorado Supreme Court
noted the absence of evidence of intent to use this water as the basis for denying the claim. Water
Supply & Storage Co. v. Curtis, 733 P.2d 680, 684-85 (1987). In a change-of-use case, the Colorado
Supreme Court embraced the notion of “contemplated draft” to quantify the extent of a conditional
appropriation. Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co. v. City of Aspen, 193 Colo. 478, 485, 568 P.2d
45, 50 (1977).
85
First Interim Report of the Special Master at 71, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765
(2011) (No. 137, Orig.).
86
Id. at 72. In support he cited to cases concluding that a party using this unconsumed water
as it returns to a stream cannot insist the original appropriator continue to make this water available.
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free to recapture the water and apply it to beneficial use.” 87 He quoted
from a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court upholding the right of the
Bureau of Reclamation to capture return waters and make them available
for use by others in a federal reclamation project. 88 He identified a
second line of cases allowing recapture of water still on the
appropriator’s property. 89 From these cases he concluded: “If
appropriators can capture and reuse waste water while it is still on their
land, it would seem to follow that appropriators have a right to reduce or
eliminate the return flows entirely by increasing irrigation efficiency,
lining canals, and similar actions.” 90 While cases applying the doctrine of
recapture seem to support the right of an appropriator to consume more
water by using more efficient irrigation techniques, the Master
acknowledged such cases are not precisely on point with the issue in this
litigation. 91
The U.S. Supreme Court relied on its previous decision in Ide v.
United States, 92 a case involving a Bureau of Reclamation project, and
on Arizona Public Service Co. v. Long, 93 a case concerning sale of
treated effluent from a wastewater treatment facility. The Court noted
that Utah and Colorado cases restrict recapture and reuse of water that
returns to the same stream from which it was originally diverted. 94 But it
focused its attention primarily on the relevant cases in Wyoming and
Montana which, the Court found, squarely support the right of the
original irrigation appropriator to recapture and reuse unconsumed
water. 95
The Master and the Court were entirely correct in finding that the
doctrine of recapture provides support for the right of an appropriator to

87

Id.
Id. at 72-73 (citing Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 506 (1923)).
89
Id. at 73.
90
Id.
91
First Interim Report of the Special Master at 74, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765
(2011) (No. 137, Orig.). (“None of these cases, however, involved an appropriator who increased his
efficiency and consumption to the detriment of downstream appropriators on the same waterway
from which the water was diverted. For this reason, they are not on all fours with Montana’s
allegation in this case.”).
92
263 U.S. 497 (1924). The Court found the appropriation of water was intended to supply
all lands within the project boundaries, with drainage waters from one use intended to provide water
to other users. Id. at 505-06.
93
160 Ariz. 429, 773 P.2d 988 (1989). The decision regards sewage effluent as no longer
part of the natural flow subject to appropriation, apparently to give cities maximum flexibility in the
manner they dispose of the water. This decision takes the doctrine of recapture to an extreme,
justifying reuse of the water to avoid waste without regard for downstream users.
94
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at 1775.
95
Id. at 1775-76.
88
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increase consumption without liability by using more efficient irrigation
techniques. Yet, independent of this litigation, the doctrine of recapture
bears reconsideration and more careful explication. As stated, it seems
contrary to the ordinary limitations placed on appropriators to maintain
return flows upon which other appropriators depend. 96 In most cases the
right of recapture is not predicated on demonstrated intent at the time of
appropriation to recapture water. 97 It is a doctrine in need of redefinition.
An appropriation of water establishes the right to divert a specified
flow of water from a natural source such as a stream for a stated
beneficial purpose. 98 The rate of diversion provides the amount of water
reasonably necessary to carry out the beneficial purpose. 99 In irrigation,
it is the amount of water reasonably necessary to grow crops on a
specified area of land. 100 Ordinarily the diverted flow is based on a single
use of the water to irrigate the crops, with some unconsumed water
seeping into the ground and other unconsumed water running off the
fields after use. 101 Most water unconsumed in irrigation eventually finds
its way back to a stream or river unless it is intercepted by other users
along the way. 102 Unlike riparian law, prior appropriation does not
require the appropriator to return unconsumed water to the source from
which it was diverted. 103
96

See discussion accompanying notes 148-52, infra.
The only cases in which intent is mentioned are those discussing whether the water
unconsumed after use had been “abandoned” once it leaves the property. See cases discussed with
notes 129-31, infra.
98
See, e.g., Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist.,
256 P.3d 645, 661 (Colo. 2011) (“A Colorado prior appropriation water right arises only by
application of a specified quantity of water to an actual beneficial use.”).
99
See, e.g., Rominiecki v. McIntyre Livestock Corp., 633 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Colo. 1981)
(“An implied limitation is read into every decree adjudicating a water right that diversions are
limited to an amount sufficient for the purpose for which the appropriation was made, even though
such limitation may be less than the decreed rate of diversion.”).
100
Often, courts use the concept of “duty of water” to describe an amount of water “which, by
careful management and use, without wastage, is reasonably required to be applied to any given tract
of land for such period of time as may be adequate to produce therefrom a maximum amount of such
crops as ordinarily are grown thereon.” Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden,
129 Colo. 575, 584-585, 272 P.2d 629, 634 (1954). The appropriation includes not only the amount
of water that must be applied on the field for irrigation but also water necessary to carry this amount
from the river to the field.
101
See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Willows Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829, 833 n.8 (Colo.
1993) (“An appropriator of native, tributary water, which historically flows back to the stream from
whence it comes, is permitted only one use of the water because the return flows are subject to water
rights on the stream in the order of their priority.”).
102
Id.
103
See, e.g., Oppenlander v. Left-Hand Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 142, 148-49, 31 P. 854, 856
(1892) (“A riparian proprietor, owning both sides of a running stream, may divert the water
therefrom, provided he returns the same to the natural stream before it leaves his own land, so that it
may reach the riparian proprietor below without material diminution in quantity, quality, or force.
97
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The many cases allowing the original appropriator to recapture
water unconsumed after use appear to have at least two different bases.
One is the view that such unconsumed water is “waste” water and that
appropriators should be encouraged to make more efficient use of
appropriated water to avoid or reduce waste. 104 Thus the Court in
Lambeye v. Garcia quoted from the treatise by Kinney: “[T]he original
appropriators have the right, and in fact it is their duty, to prevent, as far
as possible, all waste of the water which they have appropriated . . . .”105
In Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., the
Utah Supreme Court said: “The appropriator has no right to divert more
waters than he can put to a beneficial use, and should waste as little as
possible.” 106 And in Lasson v. Seely, the court stated:
We therefore do not agree with plaintiff’s contention that defendant or
others using irrigation waters as upper appropriators cannot utilize
water more efficiently in the future than in the past, if such future use
would diminish the quantity of surplus or waste water which has
heretofore found its way into the slough . . . . 107

Courts often tie this sentiment about reducing waste to an
unwillingness to require a continuation of the wasteful uses for the
benefit of another party. Thus, in Application of Boyer, the Idaho
Supreme Court said: “It is axiomatic that no appropriator can compel any
other appropriator to continue the waste of water whereby the former
may benefit.” 108 In McNaughton v. Eaton, the Utah Supreme Court
stated: “But the reappropriator of such waters cannot require that the first
appropriator shall continue to waste such waters so that they will be
available for use by the reappropriator.” 109 The Wyoming Supreme Court
has said:
No appropriator can compel any other appropriator to continue the

The appropriator, though he may not own the land on either bank of a running stream, may divert the
water therefrom, and carry the same whithersoever necessity may require for beneficial use, without
returning it, or any of it, to the natural stream, in any manner.”).
104
See, e.g., Steven J. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change, 61 OR.
L. REV. 483, 489 (1982) (“Water waste in a particular irrigation operation can be considered as the
volume of water diverted from the natural water supply that is not consumptively used by the
crops.”).
105
18 Ariz. 178, 182, 157 P. 977, 978-79 (1916) (quoting 1 CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 661 (2d ed. 1912)).
106
105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866, 870 (1943) (Wolfe, C.J., concurring).
107
120 Utah 679, 687, 238 P.2d 418, 422 (1951).
108
73 Idaho 152, 162, 248 P.2d 540, 546 (1952).
109
121 Utah 394, 403, 242 P.2d 570, 574 (1952).
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waste of water which benefits the former. If the senior appropriator by
a different method of irrigation can so utilize his water that it is all
consumed in transpiration and consumptive use and no waste water
returns by seepage or percolation to the river, no other appropriator
can complain. 110

And the Arizona Supreme Court has stated:
The very nature of waste water requires the application of different
rules governing the rights of the junior appropriator. Waste water
exists only as long as there is waste. No appropriator can compel any
other appropriator to continue the waste of water which benefits the
former. If the senior appropriator, through scientific and technical
advances, can utilize his water so that none is wasted, no other
appropriator can complain. 111

When is unconsumed water “waste,” and when is it simply the
residue of that amount of water necessary to properly irrigate the land?
The cases make no attempt to distinguish unconsumed water that is truly
waste from other unconsumed water. 112 As the Master pointed out, courts
use a variety of terms to refer to this unconsumed water. 113 Yet when a
court characterizes the unconsumed water as waste, that water takes on a
special legal status. 114 It may be recaptured by the original appropriator
110

Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass’n, 77 Wyo. 80, 101, 307 P.2d 593, 601 (1957).
Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Long, 160 Ariz. 429, 437-38, 773 P.2d 988, 996-97 (1989). This
case is perhaps the most extreme decision respecting the appropriator’s right to reuse waste water. It
involved whether a city must continue to discharge treated effluent from its wastewater facility into a
stream or whether it can sell this effluent to another party for use elsewhere. The Court offered this
view of the status of waste water: “The very nature of waste water requires the application of
different rules governing the rights of the junior appropriator. Waste water exists only as long as
there is waste. No appropriator can compel any other appropriator to continue the waste of water
which benefits the former.” 773 P.2d at 996. Since effluent is waste water, the discharger is under no
obligation to continue discharging it into the stream, the Court held, and may instead sell or
otherwise dispose of it. “We therefore hold that the Cities may discontinue the discharge of sewage
effluent without violating the rights of those persons or entities which have previously appropriated
it.” Id. at 997.
112
An exception is Green Valley Ditch Co. v. Schneider, 50 Colo. 606, 115 P. 705 (1911).
Here the water had been diverted to the stream but not applied to any use before being discharged.
113
“Depending on the context, courts have called this water ‘seepage,’ ‘waste,’ ‘wastage,’
‘run-off,’ ‘percolation,’ and various other terms. The use of this terminology, unfortunately, often
differs among courts and even among cases in the same jurisdiction, so that too much weight cannot
be placed on the particular terminology used in any case.” First Interim Report of the Special Master
at 71, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.).
114
In City of Boulder v. Boulder & Left Hand Ditch Co., 192 Colo. 219, 557 P.2d 1182
(1986), the Colorado Supreme Court attempted to draw a distinction between waste water and return
flows. It provided the following explanation of waste water: “A typical example is that of the
irrigator who turns water into individual furrows traversing his field. That portion which is not
absorbed into the earth or transpires remains in the furrow at the end thereof, and is collected in a
111

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol5/iss2/5

16

MacDonnell: The Doctrine of Recapture

2012]

THE DOCTRINE OF RECAPTURE

281

at any time and reused, even if that water has returned to the stream and
been appropriated by others. 115 Those who have put that water to
beneficial use have no recourse if the recapture of this water by the
original appropriator for more efficient use under the original purpose
impairs their subsequent use. 116
In fact, it is common for some portion of the water applied to
irrigate crops not to be consumed in the process. 117 Flood and furrow
irrigation require the application of enough water to reach the plants
across the entire irrigated area. Sufficient amounts of water must be
applied at the upgradient side of the field to ensure that water reaches
plants at the lower end of the field. That means plants on the upgradient
side are somewhat overwatered and, typically, plants at the lower end of
the field are underwatered. 118 This physical problem is one of the
primary reasons irrigators are shifting to sprinklers that can more evenly
deliver water to the entire cultivated area. Moreover, the unconsumed
water returns to a stream and becomes part of the flows upon which other
appropriators depend, whether it is called waste, seepage, runoff, or
return flows. To the extent these cases are simply making the point that
incidental beneficiaries (those using the water before it returns to a
stream) cannot require its continued availability, characterization as
waste does not matter. But the cases that have extended this rule to
eliminate any continued obligations to maintain return flows simply
because the water is characterized as waste are clearly wrong.

waste ditch. The contents of the waste ditch is waste water.” 557 P.2d at 1185. The court defined
return flows as follows: “Return flow is not waste water. Rather, it is irrigation water seeping back to
a stream after it has gone underground to perform its nutritional function.” Id. Apparently based on
this distinction, the court went on to conclude: “We are here involved with the effect of a change of
place of use because return flow results from use and not from water carried in the surface in ditches
and wasted into the stream.” Id. at 1186. At issue was whether water appropriated by one ditch
company could be shared with another company with which it shared a common diversion ditch
without making a formal change of use if the use by the second company resulted in water returning
to a different watershed.
115
See, e.g., Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Long, 160 Ariz. 429, 773 P.2d 988 (1989).
116
Id.
117
“The quantity of water ‘beneficially used’ in irrigation, for example, has always included
some measure of necessary loss such as runoff, evaporation, deep percolation, leakage, and seepage
(regardless of whether any of it returns to the stream).” Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at 1778.
Irrigation uses generally consume only about 50% of water diverted. Shupe, supra note 104, at 490.
118
See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, No. 105, Original, 1997 WL 33796878, at *15 (U.S. Sept. 9,
1997) (“Miles testified that it was fairly common practice to run water for about 12 hours, 9 or 10 of
which would be required to get the water through the field. As a result, ‘the lower end of the field is
usually under-irrigated, while the upper end is often over-irrigated.’”); see also Estate of Steed
Through Kazan v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 846 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Utah 1992) (“With a floodtype irrigation system, crops are somewhat over watered at the upper end and under watered at the
lower end.”).
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Under the doctrine of beneficial use, water cannot be diverted that is
not required to accomplish the use. 119 The intention of the beneficial-use
requirement is to preclude the waste of water. 120 Thus, if the
unconsumed water is truly waste, the appropriator should have no right
to divert it. Rather than according the appropriator a right of recapture, it
would seem better to reduce his or her diversion right to eliminate the
unnecessary removal of water from the stream.
It seems entirely possible courts started referring to unconsumed
water as waste simply because it had not been entirely used up
(consumed) in the process of irrigation. 121 The intent was not necessarily
to imply the water should never have been diverted but to recognize that,
in the water-limited West, the objective is to fully use (consume) every
possible drop of water. Nevertheless, it appears that many courts took the
meaning of waste water literally and adopted the view the appropriator
should seek to stop making this kind of unproductive use of water. The
problem arose, however, when they started allowing recapture without
regard for uses being made by other appropriators. It makes no sense to
treat so-called waste water as if it is not part of the hydrologic system.
An alternative basis for allowing recapture is the view of
appropriated water as the property of the appropriator while in his or her
possession and thus subject to the appropriator’s determination
respecting use of the water. Thus, in Farmers’ Irr. Dist. v. Frank, the
court said:
The person making the first application for the use of water to water
any particular tract of land is given by the law an exclusive right to the
water, so long as he applies it to the beneficial use, and is granted,
therefore, in a certain sense, a monopoly of the use of the water which
he has been allowed to appropriate. 122

In United States v. Haga, the federal district court in Idaho stated:

119

Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at 1772 (“The scope of the right is limited by the concept
of “beneficial use.” That concept restricts a farmer ‘to the amount of water that is necessary to
irrigate his land by making a reasonable use of the water.’”) (quoting 1 CLESSON S. KINNEY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 586 (2d ed. 1912)).
120
See, e.g., Ready Mixed Concrete Co. in Adams Cnty. v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation
Co., 115 P.3d 638, 645 n. 4 (Colo. 2005) (“Wasting water by diverting it when not needed for
beneficial use, or running more water than is reasonably needed for application to beneficial use, is
‘waste.’”); see also A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5:68 (West 2010)
(“The principal function of the beneficial use doctrine is to prevent waste.”).
121
Kinney notes three different meanings for the term waste water: water actually wasted,
water used that runs off the land, and water lost to use because of unavoidable causes. 1 CLESSON S.
KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 523 (2d ed. 1912).
122
72 Neb. 136, 100 N.W. 286, 294 (1904).
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One who by the expenditure of money and labor diverts appropriable
water from a stream, and thus makes it available for fruitful purposes,
is entitled to its exclusive control so long as he is able and willing to
apply it to beneficial uses, and such right extends to what is commonly
known as wastage from surface run-off and deep percolation,
necessarily incident to practical irrigation. Considerations of both
public policy and natural justice strongly support such a rule. 123

The Utah Supreme Court has stated: “While the water is under his
dominion and control, he is entitled to use it on his own land in such
beneficial manner as he sees fit,” 124 and, “[i]t is well established under
the authorities cited in our previous opinion that waters diverted from a
natural source, applied to irrigation and recaptured before they escape
from the original appropriator’s control, still belong to the original
appropriator. If the original appropriator has a beneficial use for such
waters, he may again reuse them and no one can acquire a right superior
to that of the original appropriator.” 125 That court has also said: “The
original appropriator as long as he has possession and control thereof
may sell or transfer the right to the use of such waters to someone other
than the reappropriator as long as he does so in good faith and they are
beneficially used, or he may recapture and use them for further beneficial
use if he does so before they get beyond his property and control.” 126 The
Montana Supreme Court said: “The owner of the right to use the waterhis private property while in his possession, may collect it, recapture it,
before it leaves his possession, but, after it gets beyond his control, it
thus becomes waste and is subject to appropriation by another.” 127
This expansive view of an appropriator’s right to do whatever he or
she wants with water diverted and made available for use ultimately gave
way to the view that an appropriation may be used only for the purposes
for which it was made and in the amounts those purposes require.
Samuel Wiel in his treatise on water rights discussed the transition in the
law underway at that time (the early 1900s) from what he called a
“possessory” to a “specific use” approach. 128 The possessory system

123

276 F. 41, 43 (D. Idaho 1921).
Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679, 688, 238 P.2d 418, 422 (1951).
125
Smithfield W. Bench Irr. Co. v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 113 Utah 356, 363, 195 P.2d
249, 252-53 (1948).
126
McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 403-04, 242 P.2d 570, 574 (1952).
127
Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 93 Mont. 248, 17 P.2d 1074, 1080 (1933).
128
SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 500 (3d ed. 1911). Wiel was
not altogether sure the transition was good. He seemed concerned that the specific-use approach
might constrain irrigation by being overly limiting in the amount of water that can be appropriated:
“Whether a complete change from a possessory to a specific purpose system is desirable is a difficult
124
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accorded an almost unlimited right to the party capturing the water to
determine its use so long as that use was not wasteful. The specific use
system limited the appropriation to the beneficial use for which it was
made.
This status of ownership is lost only when the water leaves the
appropriator’s possession and control, at which point the appropriator is
regarded as having abandoned his or her ownership. According to a
federal district court in Idaho, “One who diverts or develops water loses
his superior right only when and so long as he is out of possession, or
when he voluntarily abandons the water, or ceases to have a beneficial
use for it.” 129 The Washington Supreme Court has offered this view:
Upon the principle that the law of appropriation as applied to the arid
regions will not tolerate a waste of water, it has been held that water
that is allowed to run to waste after use on the land of the appropriator
is abandoned, and that lower appropriators are entitled to the surplus.
But abandonment, like appropriation, is a question of intent, and to be
determined with reference to the conduct of the parties. The intent to
abandon and an actual relinquishment must concur, for courts will not
lightly decree an abandonment of a property so valuable as that of
130
water in an irrigated region.

The Eighth Circuit placed abandonment of the unconsumed water at the
time it reaches the stream from which it was diverted: “Seepage and
waste water may be said to have been abandoned by the original
appropriator when it is returned or allowed to return to its natural
channel, with no intention on the part of the appropriator of recapturing
it.” 131 These cases allow the incidental beneficiary of the unconsumed
water to put it to use but, again, without the power to require the original
appropriator to continue to make it available.
Recapture cases often seem concerned primarily with limiting
responsibility of the appropriator to continue to make unconsumed water
available to downgradient users. Such a view makes eminent sense
because it is obvious the original appropriator cannot be compelled to
continue diverting and using water. Incidental beneficiaries may be able
to use this water so long as it is available but without right to compel its
availability. An Oregon court described the ability to use return water in
the following terms:

question in the policy of the law.” Id., § 477, at 501.
129
Griffiths v. Cole, 264 F. 369, 374 (D. Idaho 1919).
130
Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 435, 103 P. 641, 643 (1909) (citations omitted).
131
Ramshorn Ditch Co. v. United States, 269 F. 80, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1920).
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The better authorities held that a claimant to waste water acquires a
temporary right only to whatever water escapes from the works or
lands of others, and which cannot find its way back to the natural
stream from which it was taken; that such a use of the water does not
carry with it the right to any specific quantity of water, nor the right to
interfere with the water flowing in the ditches or works of others
lawfully appropriating it, and the appropriators are under no
obligation, nor have they the right to permit any specific quantity of
water to be discharged as ‘waste water’ for his benefit. 132

The cases have been uniform in denying prescription as a basis for
protecting uses by incidental beneficiaries. 133
Indeed, it is difficult to find a case reciting the doctrine of recapture
in which the original appropriator is in fact wanting to recapture
unconsumed water for use on the lands irrigated under the appropriation.
In Burkhart v. Meiberg, for example, the original appropriators
constructed a ditch on their lands to collect unconsumed water so they
could convey it to other lands they wanted to irrigate. 134 In Binning v.
Miller, the original appropriator constructed a dam in a swale on his land
to collect unconsumed water that he wanted to use on other lands. 135 The
cases seem more intent on denying rights to subsequent users than
affirming rights in the original appropriator. Thus, in Garns v. Rollins the
Utah Supreme Court decided that even though the incidental beneficiary
had been collecting and using the water for thirty years, no right as
against the original appropriator could vest. 136 While the litigation was
triggered by actions of the appropriator to recapture the unconsumed
water, there was no discussion of the uses to which this water was to be

132

Vaughan v. Kolb, 130 Or. 506, 515, 280 P. 518, 521 (1929). The court went on to state:
“We see no reason why the right to waste or spring water may not be permanent, even though the
use thereof may be interrupted; that is, the right exists to be exercised when there is water available.”
280 P. at 522.
133
See, e.g., Thompson v. Bingham, 78 Idaho 305, 308, 302 P.2d 948, 949 (1956): “It is a
rule long recognized that a landowner cannot acquire a prescriptive right to the continued flow of
waste or seepage water from the land of another, that is, seepage water or waste water running from
one’s land to that of another need not be continued and it may be intercepted and taken by such
owner at any time and used on the land to which it is appurtenant. Garns v. Rollins, 41 Utah 260,
125 P. 867; Burkart v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 86 P. 98, 6 L.R.A.,N.S., 1104, 119 Am.St.Rep. 279;
Smith Canal or Ditch Co. v. Colorado Ice & Storage Co., 34 Colo. 485, 82 P. 940, 3 L.R.A., N.S.,
1148; Petersen v. Cache County Drainage District No. 5, 77 Utah 256, 294 P. 289. For collection of
authorities see Ann.Cas.1915C, 1165.”
134
37 Colo. 187, 86 P. 98 (1906).
135
102 P.2d 54, 61 (Wyo. 1940) (“Binning does not claim that he can use the waste and
seepage water in question upon the land for which the water was appropriated, but wants to use it on
land, about 100 acres in extent, which is adjoining.”).
136
125 P. 867 (Utah 1912).
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put. As in most of these cases, the court was concerned only with
establishing the principle that the incidental recipient of the water cannot
demand its continued availability.
An unlimited right of recapture is contrary to the basic principle of
prior appropriation that limits the amount of water to the quantity
actually beneficially used. 137 This understanding has developed
especially clearly in the law governing changes of use in which courts
have stated that the extent of an appropriation is measured by historic
use. 138 The Colorado Supreme Court has noted: “Over an extended
period of time a pattern of historic diversions and use under the decreed
right at its place of use will mature and become the measure of the
appropriation for change purposes.” 139 The recapture of unconsumed
water for use on lands included as part of the original appropriation
would be consistent with that appropriation only if contemplated when
the appropriation was made. 140 The cases supporting use of unconsumed
water because its possession had been “abandoned” by the original
appropriator indirectly support the view that recapture should be based
on intent. 141
Many federal reclamation projects were specifically designed to
recapture return flows from irrigation on higher lands to deliver water to
irrigators on lower lands. This situation is illustrated in Ramshorn Ditch
Co. v. United States, 142 in which the United States sought to prevent nonproject irrigators in Nebraska from diverting “seepage, drainage, and
waste” water provided from the North Platte project. 143 The Eighth
Circuit noted:
Seepage and waste water may be said to have been abandoned by the
original appropriator when it is returned or allowed to return to its
natural channel, with no intention on the part of the appropriator of
recapturing it. To constitute abandonment, however, there must be an
137

See, e.g., Ready Mixed Concrete Co. in Adams Cnty. v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation
Co., 115 P.3d 638, 645 (Colo. 2005) (“Because actual beneficial use under a decreed water right
defines the genesis, maturation, and limitation of every appropriative water right in this state, we
have held that every water decree includes an implied limitation that diversions cannot exceed that
which can be used beneficially . . . .”).
138
See, e.g., id. at 645-46 (“[T]he right to change a water right is limited to that amount of
water consumed beneficially over a representative historical period of time by use pursuant to the
decree at the appropriator’s place of use.”).
139
High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 719 (Colo.
2005).
140
A common example would be the gradual development of lands intended to be irrigated by
the original appropriator eventually requiring more complete use of the diverted water.
141
See, e.g., Ramshorn Ditch Co. v. United States, 269 F. 80, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1920).
142
269 F. 80 (8th Cir. 1920).
143
Id. at 83.
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intent to abandon, the existence or nonexistence of which is a question
of fact to be determined according to the evidence presented in each
particular case, and one whose rights depend on an alleged
abandonment must assume the burden of proving such
abandonment. 144

Similarly, in United States v. Haga, 145 the Court noted the appropriation
of water for the project by the United States specifically included a
provision expressing its intent to use waste water. 146 Consequently, the
Court upheld the right of the United States to capture this water, even
when it had returned to a natural stream, for use by other project
beneficiaries. 147
An obvious concern about unlimited recapture is possible effects on
return flows upon which downstream appropriators depend. The
potential problem is illustrated in the Colorado case, Comstock v.
Ramsay. 148 In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that upstream
diversions from the South Platte completely dried up the channel for a
distance until return flows from irrigation reached the channel, thus
providing a supply for the next set of appropriators on the river. 149 The
court stated: “We take judicial notice of the fact that practically every
decree on the South Platte River, except possibly only the very early
ones, is dependent for its supply, and for years and years has been, upon
return, waste and seepage waters.” 150 On this basis the court denied an
appropriation of seepage water that would interfere with its return to the
stream. 151 This concern seems especially pronounced in situations where

144

Id. at 83-84 (citations omitted).
276 F. 41 (D. Idaho 1921).
146
Id. at 47 (“The form of application for water rights prepared by the reclamation service
contained a provision reserving to the government the right to reclaim waste water.”).
147
Id. at 43 (“Nor is it essential to his control that the appropriator maintain continuous actual
possession of such water. So long as he does not abandon it or forfeit it by failure to use, he may
assert his rights.”); see also Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497 (1927).
148
55 Colo. 244, 133 P. 1107 (1913).
149
Id. at 247-48.
150
Id. at 254.
151
Id. at 255 (“Every appropriation of water on this stream, claimed and decreed for irrigation
purposes, has been so claimed and decreed upon the theory that all waste and seepage water arising
from the irrigation of land, or from the construction and maintenance of reservoirs using water from
the river, and naturally returning to it, is available to supply such appropriations and decrees. To now
permit independent appropriation and diversion of these waters in a way to adversely affect prior
appropriations and decrees, is in direct conflict alike with the spirit of the law under which such
priorities have been decreed and the practical purposes for which these appropriations have been
made and recognized.”). The Court emphasized the fact-specific context of the decision: “We do not
hold that there can be no independent appropriation of seepage, return and spring waters; but on the
contrary, where such appropriation does not interfere with a prior right, that it may be done upon
145
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courts have suggested the original appropriator can recapture and use the
water to extinction or even sell the water to others. 152
How then to restate the doctrine of recapture to better accord with
established principles of prior appropriation? The doctrine should be
limited to those appropriations that contemplated the necessity for such
recapture to achieve their intended beneficial purpose. Otherwise, water
properly diverted and applied to beneficial use that remains unconsumed
after use should be regarded as returned to the hydrologic system and
available for use according to state laws once it leaves the appropriator’s
lands. 153 This rule should govern whether the water can be captured on
the appropriator’s land and whether the water is called waste, seepage, or
anything else.
VI. THE CHALLENGE OF IRRIGATION WATER USE EFFICIENCY
The Supreme Court’s decision is perhaps most important for its
analysis concerning whether installation of sprinklers or other more
efficient irrigation systems is within the scope of the original
appropriation. Because such a large portion of the American West’s
limited water supply is used to irrigate crops, 154 much attention has been
given to the importance of improving the efficiency with which water is
used in agriculture. 155 The primary means by which such improvements
are being made is through the replacement of traditional surface
irrigation methods, such as flood or furrow irrigation, with sprinkler

facts and conditions which warrant it.” Id. at 256.
152
See, e.g., McNaughton v. Easton, 121 Utah 394, 403-04, 242 P.2d 570, 574 (1952) (“The
original appropriator as long as he has possession and control thereof may sell or transfer the right
to the use of such waters to someone other than the reappropriator as long as he does so in good faith
and they are beneficially used, or he may recapture and use them for further beneficial use if he does
so before they get beyond his property and control.”); Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass’n, 77 Wyo. 80,
101, 307 P.2d 593, 601 (1957) (“No appropriator can compel any other appropriator to continue the
waste of water which benefits the former. If the senior appropriator by a different method of
irrigation can so utilize his water that it is all consumed in transpiration and consumptive use and no
waste water returns by seepage or percolation to the river, no other appropriator can complain.”).
153
The states take widely differing approaches regarding legal rights to use such water,
particularly before it returns to the source from which it was diverted. The confusion in the law
applying to this water is properly the subject of another law review article.
154
“Irrigation is critical to agriculture in the United States: nearly half of the value of all crops
sold comes from the 16 percent of harvested cropland that is irrigated. In the process, agriculture
accounts for over 80 percent of water consumed (i.e., withdrawn from surface- or groundwater
sources and lost to the immediate water environment through evaporation, plant transpiration,
incorporation in products or crops, or consumption by humans or livestock).” U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Data Sets, Western Irrigated Agriculture,
www.ers.usda.gov/data/westernirrigation/ (last updated July 20, 2004).
155
See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A NEW ERA FOR IRRIGATION (1996).
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systems. 156 It was the installation of sprinklers in the Tongue and Powder
River basins of Wyoming that concerned Montana.
Some analysts have cautioned against promoting the installation and
use of more efficient means of irrigation, arguing that the resultant
increased consumption in existing uses will produce a net reduction in
the usable water supply. 157 They are responding to the simplistic view
that water “saved” in irrigation use can then be made available for other,
non-irrigation uses. 158 Using what they call a “basinwide” perspective,
they emphasize that water unconsumed in use by one irrigator becomes
the supply for another irrigator. 159 Assuming the objective is to irrigate
as many acres as possible with the available water supply, they argue
existing patterns of use accomplish this objective. 160
It is common for there to be a gap between irrigation
“requirements,” the ideal water supply that would maximize production
of the crop, and actual water availability—especially in the late irrigation
season. With improved ability to control the delivery of water to plants, it
is likely that more per unit of water diverted or withdrawn from its

156

According to the Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service, between 1979
and 1994 the use of traditional surface methods of irrigation methods declined from 63% to 51%.
Terry A. Howell, Enhancing Water Use Efficiency in Irrigated Agriculture, 93 AGRONOMY J. 281,
284 (2001). During this period the use of sprinklers increased from 36% to 44%, with the use of
center pivot sprinklers increasing from about 17% to over 30%. Id.
157
See, e.g., Frank A. Ward & Manuel Pulido-Vasquez, Water Conservation in Irrigation
Can Increase Water Use, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18,215, 18,218 (2008) (“We conclude that in
river basins where downstream users and future generations depend on the unconsumed portion of
diversions in the form of returns to the stream and raised aquifer storage, subsidies for conservation
technology investments are unlikely to bring about a new supply of water but will likely lead to
increased depletions.”). They are particularly focused on whether public subsidies for improved
irrigation efficiencies are warranted. Their study location, the Rio Grande, is an extremely watershort part of the western United States. See also Ray Huffaker & Norman Whittlesey, The Allocative
Efficiency and Water Conservation Potential of Water Law Encouraging Investments in On-Farm
Efficiency, 24 AGRIC. ECON. 47, 54 (2005) (“Conservation policy encouraging irrigators to invest in
increased on-farm irrigation efficiency is economically inefficient because illusory water savings
cannot generate the additional basinwide economic benefits needed to offset the cost of
investment.”).
158
See, e.g., George W. Pring & Karen A. Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barrier to
Conservation and Efficient Use of Water in the West, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, pt. II
(1979) (“One study indicates that, by increased conveyance and on-farm efficiency, total U.S.
irrigation diversions could be reduced from the present 195 million af/y to 147 million, while still
providing for a 10% projected acreage increase, thereby freeing nearly 50 million af/y for other
uses.”) (footnote omitted); see also articles cited in Huffaker & Whittlesey, supra note 157, at 47.
159
Ward & Pulido-Vasquez, supra note 157, at 18,216 (“One user’s water inefficiency often
serves as the source of another user’s water supply.”).
160
See, e.g., David B. Schorr, Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the
Creation of Property Rights, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 3 (2005) (purpose of prior appropriation was enable
widespread availability of water rights for irrigated agriculture).
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source will be used and consumed by the crop. 161 Thus, these analysts
conclude, irrigators will consume more water than they have historically,
reducing the supply of water normally available to downstream
appropriators. 162 Indeed, such a result seems likely in water-short
locations where appropriators have not been able to provide sufficient
water to their fields—the case in many areas of the West. 163 It also seems
likely that crop production on these lands will improve—an obvious
benefit for the farmer. 164 And, contrary to the view of those opposing
improved on-farm water use efficiency, it is not clear the net result
would be an economic loss. 165
Existing patterns of water use in the western United States have
developed over as much as 150 years. Much of that development
responded to the manner in which existing irrigation uses already had
altered stream hydrology, using the remaining water then available in
different locations and at different times. 166 In this way, virtually the
161

See, e.g., Ward & Pulido-Vasquez, supra note 157, at 18,216, tbl.1 (comparing water
requirements for flood compared to drip irrigation).
162
Thus, Ward and Pulido-Vasquez state: “Our findings also suggest that where return flows
are an important source of downstream water supply, reduced deliveries from the adoption of more
efficient irrigation measures will redistribute the basin’s water supply, which could impair existing
water right holders who depend on that return flow.” Id. at 18,219; see also Huffaker & Whittlesey,
supra note 157, at 59 (“In effect, the efficiency improving farm’s additional consumptive use is
funded by an involuntary water transfer and tradeoff of agricultural benefits from a downstream
irrigator.”).
163
Venn found the use of sprinklers resulted in substantially increased flows in the river in
May and June and somewhat diminished flows in August and September. Brian J. Venn, et al.,
Hydrologic Impacts Due to Conversion from Flood to Sprinkler Irrigation Practices, (May/June
2004) (Master of Science Thesis, Department of Civil and Architectural Engineering, University of
Wyoming), at 200, available at ascelibrary.org/iro/resource/1/jidedh/v130/i3.
164
Ward & Pulido-Vasquez, supra note 157, at 18,216 (“A linear relationship is typical
between ET and crop yield over a wide range of crops and water applications. So, irrigation
technologies that apply water at optimal times and locations in plant root zones increase crop
consumptive use of water and crop yield as irrigation efficiency increases. When yield goes up, ET
typically rises.”) (citation omitted); see also Venn et al., supra note 163, at 197 (reporting increases
in crop yields for alfalfa from an average of 1.6 tons/acre to an average of 2.11 tons/acre when
converting from flood to sprinkler irrigation in the Salt River of western Wyoming).
165
Ward and Pulido-Vasquez conclude there would be economic loss measured at the
national level because they emphasize the public subsidy involved in promoting more efficient use
of water. Ward & Pulido-Vasquez, supra note 157, at 18,219 (“Where the taxpayer’s cost of the
irrigation subsidy is included in total costs, national net benefits fall from a high of $0.543 billion
with no subsidy to a low of $0.537 billion with a 100% subsidy.”).
166
It is common for about half the water diverted from a stream to be consumed by plants or
evaporated; the other half returns to the hydrologic system in a variety of ways, including as
groundwater. See Shupe, supra note 104, at 490 (“Nearly one-fourth of the streamflow withdrawn by
a typical irrigation fails to reach the farm boundary, while only fifty-three percent of the remainder is
actually used by the crop.”) (citing INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S.
DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, IRRIGATION WATER USE AND
MANAGEMENT 12, 22 (1979)). Especially this groundwater recharge is likely to return to the stream
after some delay, thus providing flows at times that often were not available under natural
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entire water supply of many western rivers became fully utilized during
the irrigation season. Those concerned about the adverse effects of
irrigation efficiency recognize that improved efficiency is likely to
reduce water availability to those users.
The difficulty with this view is that it implies no changes can be
made in the manner in which water is now used unless all other users are
kept whole. 167 It presumes that a hydrologic system that has been totally
transformed for human uses now must be maintained to continue those
same uses. It has the undoubted merit of providing protection to existing
users but at the expense of preventing or seriously discouraging the kinds
of changes needed today. We constructed these complex hydrologic
networks to meet irrigation demands in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, and we can reconstruct these networks to better meet
contemporary needs and interests.
More to the point, irrigators are installing sprinklers because they
help increase crop yields. 168 Water applied by sprinklers can be managed
much better than traditional surface irrigation methods. Over-saturation
of soils, impairing crop growth, can be avoided. Water temperature may
be able to be better managed. While sprinklers represent a significant
capital investment, they save labor and are far more convenient than
traditional irrigation practices. 169 In many situations they are simply
more profitable than traditional irrigation methods. It would not make
economic sense to deny irrigators the ability to make such improvements
simply because they reduce return flows.
There are other benefits associated with use of sprinklers. Since
they require less water, less is diverted from streams and withdrawn from
groundwater aquifers during the irrigation season. 170 Reduced return
flows mean less fertilizers and pesticides coming into streams and
groundwater aquifers in those places where they are widely used.
Reduced return flows also mean less salinity, selenium, and other
potentially harmful soil constituents being leached and carried into

conditions—especially in the late summer irrigation season.
167
Ward and Pulido-Vasquez suggest some gains might be possible through better
“accounting,” through use of less water-consumptive crops, restricting expansion of irrigated lands,
and use of deficit irrigation. Ward & Pulido-Vasquez, supra note 157, at 18,219.
168
Venn et al., supra note 163, at 197. This study found crop yields for alfalfa improved by
between 50-100%. Id. at 21.
169
KAN. STATE UNIV., IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT SERIES, THE ECONOMICS OF CONVERTING
FROM SURFACE TO SPRINKLER IRRIGATION FOR VARIOUS PUMPING CAPACITIES 1 (Nov. 2000),
available at www.ksre.ksu.edu/library/ageng2/MF2471.pdf (“Labor savings are also commonly
thought to be a major consideration in switching from furrow surface irrigation to center pivot
irrigation systems.”).
170
See, e.g., Venn et al., supra note 163, at 198.
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surface and groundwater sources.
Prior-appropriation law is generally very solicitous of protecting
existing water rights. Senior appropriators are accorded absolute
protection in times of shortage, entitled to place a “call” on a river that
may require every other appropriator to totally curtail its water use. 171
That call is honored without regard to the value of the use to which the
water is placed and even without regard to whether the senior absolutely
requires the use of all of the water to which it is entitled. 172 Other
appropriators are said to be protected in the flow conditions present at
their headgates at the time their appropriations were established. 173 All
appropriators are protected from injury resulting from changes of point
of diversion, place of use, and purpose of use. 174 Appropriators are
allowed to use sometimes highly inefficient methods of diversion,
delivery, and application of water so long as those methods are the norm
in the area. 175 Even the use of the term water “right” is intended to
suggest that an appropriation is accorded a special status that trumps
other interests. 176
Of course, water is a public resource. Appropriation is the
authorized mechanism by which private uses of water are established. An
appropriation established under state water law is not a guarantee of any
fixed amount of water. It authorizes the diversion, in priority, of a
maximum rate of flow from a particular source for a specified use. The
extent of the diversion is limited to the amount of water reasonably
necessary to achieve the purpose of the appropriation. 177 The actual
171

As stated in Empire Lodge Homeowners Ass’n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1144 n.5 (Colo.
2001), “A call is placed on a river when a senior appropriator forces upstream juniors to let sufficient
water flow to meet the requirements of the senior priority.” (quoting USI Props. E., Inc. v. Simpson,
938 P.2d 168, 171 n.2 (Colo.1997)).
172
An increasingly common situation involves senior surface water rights calling out junior
groundwater pumping. No consideration is given to relative merits of the water uses, only the
priorities. See, e.g., Well Augmentation Subdistrict of Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. City
of Aurora, 221 P.3d 399 (Colo. 2009); Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50 (Colo. 2003).
173
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at 1773 (“Because each new appropriator is entitled to
the stream as it exists when he finds it, the general rule is that ‘if a change in these conditions is
made by [a senior] appropriator, which interferes with the flow of the water to the material injury of
[the junior appropriator’s] rights, he may justly complain.’”) (citing 2 KINNEY, supra note 121, §
803).
174
The Special Master reviewed this issue at length. First Interim Report of the Special
Master at 66-69, Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011) (No. 137, Orig.).
175
See, e.g., TARLOCK, supra note 120, § 5:67.
176
Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Future of Water Law, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 257, 260 (1989); see also Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public
Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 475 (1989).
177
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (Westlaw 2012) (“‘Beneficial use’ is the use
of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to
accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made . . . .”).
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amount of water that is diverted varies widely across the period of use
and from year to year, dependent on a variety of factors. 178 While courts
have generally been unwilling to require appropriators to become more
efficient, 179 they have been very supportive when appropriators have
themselves made such improvements. 180
The concept of beneficial use evolved over time into a standard for
reviewing the purpose of use but also for evaluating the measure of the
amount of water required and for establishing a limit to that amount.181
The concept of the duty of water emerged to help explain how the
amount actually required to irrigate crops should be determined. 182
Courts emphasized the importance of taking the steps necessary to allow
water to do its “duty” of growing crops. 183 While courts have been
cognizant of the practical realities that often limit an individual
irrigator’s ability to do everything that might be desirable to maximize
that duty, they have consistently encouraged taking the steps possible in
that direction. 184 When appropriators have lined ditches to increase the
amount of diverted water that reaches the fields, the courts have
approved such efforts. 185 When appropriators have shifted from open
ditches to pipes to reduce loss of water and to make water usable by
sprinklers, the courts have approved those efforts. 186 Viewed most
charitably, the doctrine of recapture is just another example of courts

178

Irrigation appropriators from surface water sources have only a general idea of the amount
of water they will be able to divert and use when they plant their fields. Actual flows are dependent
on snow pack, runoff, temperatures, precipitation, and variety of other factors beyond their control.
179
See, e.g., Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search
for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998); see also Rogers v. Pitt, 129 F. 932,
944 (C.C.D. Nev. 1904) (“The court cannot, in the absence of any law upon the subject, compel the
farmers to use any particular system, but it might, in a case where an extravagant and wasteful
system is used, which demands more water than they are entitled to by virtue of their appropriations,
declare that under such circumstances they were not entitled to the quantity of water they were
using, and give the excess to subsequent appropriators.”).
180
See, e.g., Estate of Steed Through Kazan v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 846 P.2d 1223,
1228 (Utah 1992).
181
See text accompanying note 133, supra.
182
See TARLOCK, supra note 120, § 5:66.
183
See, e.g., Hough v. Porter, 51 Or. 318, 417, 98 P. 1083, 1101-02 (1909).
184
See, e.g., Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 161 F. 43 (9th Cir. 1908).
185
See, e.g., Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass’n, 77 Wyo. 80, 101-02, 307 P.2d 593, 601-02
(1957) (“Applying the enunciated rules of this court to the instant case, we find that plaintiff cannot
insist upon defendant’s continuing to make the seepage available to him. On the contrary, defendant
company may abandon its canal, relocate it, or line it with an impervious substance so that seepage
ceases.”).
186
Estate of Steed Through Kazan v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 846 P.2d 1223 (Utah
1992).
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encouraging irrigators to make efficient use of diverted water. 187
The critical aspect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Montana
v. Wyoming was its focus on what, under principles of prior
appropriation, is the scope of a water right and whether the scope of the
right includes the ability to utilize diverted water to accomplish the
purposes of the appropriation more efficiently. 188 While the Master and
the Court arrived at their conclusion indirectly, 189 they might just as well
have simply acknowledged the long-standing purpose of the beneficialuse requirement to encourage efficient use of diverted water and noted
that such improvements are easily within the scope of an
appropriation. 190 Thus, use of sprinklers does not run contrary to Article
V(A) of the Compact, which states: “Appropriative rights to the
beneficial uses of the water of the Yellowstone River System existing in
each signatory State as of January 1, 1950, shall continue to be enjoyed
in accordance with the laws governing the acquisition and use of water
under the doctrine of appropriation.” 191
Use of sprinklers will change stream hydrology to some degree.
Downstream appropriators will have to adjust, perhaps by installing
sprinklers as well. The changes are not likely to be dramatic, though in
very dry years their effects may well be measurable in some places.
Adoption of sprinklers is attractive to irrigators for many reasons, not
just to improve water use efficiency. It is part of a broader process of
change in irrigated agriculture itself in response to the inexorable
economics of a world economy. By holding that changes in stream
conditions resulting from improvements in irrigation approaches are not
the sort of changes that are subject to the no-injury restriction, 192 the U.S.

187

See text accompanying notes 105-07, supra. Particularly those cases characterizing return
water as waste are seeking to encourage more efficient use of water.
188
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at 1772-73 (“Montana’s pre-1950 users can therefore
‘insist that [Wyoming’s pre–1950 users] confine themselves strictly within the rights which the law
gives them, that is, to the amount of water within the extent of their appropriation which they
actually apply to some beneficial use.’ That general proposition is undisputed; the dispute here is in
its application. Is a switch to more efficient irrigation with less return flow within the extent of
Wyoming’s pre–1950 users’ existing appropriative rights, or is it an improper enlargement of that
right to the detriment of Montana’s pre–1950 water users?”) (quoting 2 KINNEY, supra note 121, §
784).
189
They did so by determining a change of irrigation method is not a change of use and by
comparing irrigation improvements to improvements encouraged under the rule of capture.
190
The Court suggested this approach when it noted: “The scope of the right is limited by the
concept of ‘beneficial use.’ That concept restricts a farmer ‘to the amount of water that is necessary
to irrigate his land by making a reasonable use of the water.’” Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at
1772 (quoting 1 KINNEY, supra note 121, § 586).
191
Yellowstone Compact, Act of Oct. 30, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-231, 65 Stat. 663, 666.
192
Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. at 1774 (“Improvements to irrigation systems seem to be
the sort of changes that fall outside the no-injury rule as it exists in Montana and Wyoming.”).
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Supreme Court’s decision is likely to encourage further irrigation water
use efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSION
While several issues still remain in the Montana v. Wyoming
litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court has now resolved the matter of
liability for increased consumption associated with conversion to
sprinklers. This decision has importance far beyond the meaning of the
Yellowstone River Compact. Despite the Court’s disclaimer, its analysis
and conclusions are likely to be adopted by prior-appropriation states,
thus removing a potential legal cloud from efforts to move to sprinkler
and drip irrigation. Although this process will not be without its
challenges for some irrigators, it is a necessary and beneficial step in the
long road to rationalizing water uses in the western United States.
The litigation also had the benefit of focusing attention on one of
the less-well-examined areas of prior-appropriation law, the so-called
doctrine of recapture. This Article has argued for clarifications in this
area of law, suggesting an intent requirement for recapture. The
widespread adoption of the recapture doctrine may have made sense in
earlier times, but the doctrine no longer fits within the water-constrained
world that exists today in the American West.
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